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Female labor force participation rates in urban India 
between 1987 and 2011 are surprisingly low and have 
stagnated since the late 1980s. Despite rising growth, 
fertility decline, and rising wages and education levels, 
married women’s labor force participation hovered 
around 18 percent. Analysis of five large cross-sectional 
micro surveys shows that a combination of supply and 
demand effects have contributed to this stagnation. The 
main supply side factors are rising household incomes 
and husband’s education as well as the falling selectivity 
of highly educated women. On the demand side, the sec-
tors that draw in female workers have expanded least, so 
that changes in the sectoral structure of employment alone 
would have actually led to declining participation rates. 
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India’s economy has grown rapidly over the past two decades, with the services sector 
accounting for a large share of growth (Bosworth and Collins 2008). India has also experienced a 
sizable fertility decline, a rapid education expansion, and a decline in the education gender gap, 
while the labor market returns to education increased (Kijima 2006; Pieters 2010). Against this 
background, it is puzzling to see that the reported female labor force participation rate in urban 
India has stagnated at around 18 percent since the 1980s. Considering these circumstances, one 
would expect a rising share of women to enter the labor force, especially in urban India where 
women have gotten much more educated and where white-collar jobs are concentrated.  
The aim of this paper is to investigate why female labor force participation (FLFP) in urban 
India stagnated despite rising education levels and rapid economic growth. Standard labor supply 
models and previous research on FLFP and economic development (Goldin 1994; Mammen and 
Paxson 2000; Blau and Kahn 2007) suggest that rising education and growth of white-collar 
services employment should draw more women into the labor force by increasing their earnings 
capacity and reducing social stigma against women’s work. On the other hand, rising household 
incomes could lead to a withdrawal of women from the labor market due to well-known income 
effect. India is not the only country where female labor force participation has stagnated despite 
overall growth, fertility decline, and rising female education. In the Middle East and North Africa, 
one can observe vast and persistent gender gaps in employment despite rising female education 
levels in many countries. This has been partly ascribed to conservative social attitudes towards 
women’s work in the region (see Gaddis and Klasen 2014), and similar factors might be at play in 
India as well. 
Understanding the causes of stagnation in FLFP matters for several reasons. India currently has 
an advantageous age structure of the population with a large and growing share of working age 
people and relatively few dependents. Optimistic predictions for India’s future growth often refer 
3 
 
to this demographic dividend, which is alleged to have accounted for about a third of East Asia’s 
high per capita growth rates in the period between 1965 and 1990 (Bloom and Williamson 1998; 
Bloom 2011). However, the benefits of a country’s demographic dividend hinge on the productive 
employment of the male and female working-age population,. In fact, high and rising female 
employment levels contribute to greater productivity growth (World Bank 2011) and have in fact 
been critical in sustaining East Asia’s high economic growth rates (Klasen and Lamanna 2009; 
Young 1995). 
Beyond women’s contribution to growth, stagnation in FLFP has implications for the degree to 
which women benefit from growth. Employment and earnings are robust determinants of 
bargaining power, with impacts on female and children’s well-being (Qian 2008; Anderson and 
Eswaran 2009; Afridi et al. 2012). If there are structural economic or cultural barriers preventing 
women’s labor force participation, women are unable to capitalize on these opportunities. 
In this paper, we estimate a simple model of female labor force participation using individual 
level cross-section data spanning the period 1987 to 2011. The model is estimated separately for 
each survey year and for women with low and high educational attainment. Our estimation results 
provide a detailed account of the impact of various factors on women’s labor force participation 
and their changes over time. We find a strong conditional relationship between education and labor 
force participation that is U-shaped, which points at the importance of social stigma for women to 
work in low-skilled jobs. Accordingly, we show that women with low education appear to be boxed 
in by the necessity to work if household incomes are very low or insecure, and stigmas attached to 
working in low-skilled jobs if they are somewhat more educated and in more secure economic 
environments. Highly educated women appear generally less constrained by family circumstances 
in their labor force participation decision.     
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The estimates are further used to decompose the stagnation of FLFP between 1987 and 2011 
into contributions by different covariates and changes in behavior and unobservables (Fairlie 
2006). On the supply side, we find that rising male incomes and education contributed to a 
withdrawal of women from the labor force, showing that the classic income effect is at work in 
urban India. On the demand side, changes in the sectoral structure of employment account for a 
further reduction in FLFP, in particular related to the declining shares of agriculture and 
manufacturing which tend to employ more women (particularly in recent years).  
The effect of rising female education on female labor force participation is more complicated. 
Besides a U-shaped relationship between education and labor force participation, our estimates 
show a large decline in the positive participation effect associated with secondary and graduate 
education. As a result, the substantial increase in educational attainment of women contributed 
only moderately to FLFP growth. We provide suggestive evidence that the declining positive effect 
of higher education is partly accounted for by an erosion of positive selection into higher education, 
that is, a declining correlation between determinants of higher educational attainment and 
unobserved determinants of labor force participation. Reasons for this could be the rapid expansion 
of education supply, but also rising marriage market returns to education, leading women to pursue 
higher education regardless of their expected labor market attachment.  
The paper is organized as follows. Section I discusses the literature on female labor force 
participation determinants, focusing in particular on economic development and rising education 
levels. Section II describes patterns of FLFP, wages, education, and employment in urban India. 
Section III presents our empirical FLFP model and estimation results, followed by the 
decomposition analysis in Section IV. Section V further investigates the relationship between 
women’s education and labor force participation. Section VI concludes.  
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I. Development, Education, and Female Labor Force Participation 
Labor force participation decisions can be the outcome of individual preferences of the woman, 
her family circumstances, as well as labor demand conditions for jobs that women are particularly 
suited for, or where employment in these jobs is seen as socially acceptable. Education can play a 
key role in shaping these supply and demand conditions. We will discuss these issues in turn.    
A common starting point for the analysis of female labor force participation is the basic static 
labor supply model (see Blundell and MaCurdy 1999), in which an increase in the wage rate 
reduces demand for leisure as its opportunity cost rises, increasing labor supply. If leisure is a 
normal good, an increase in a person’s income will increase the demand for leisure and thus reduce 
labor supply. These are the well-known substitution and income effects. For a person currently not 
working, an increase in the wage rate only has a substitution effect, increasing her incentive to 
work (i.e., one would always expect a positive own wage effect at the extensive margin). An 
increase in unearned income (nonlabor income or labor income earned by other household 
members, particularly the husband) constitutes a pure income effect and therefore reduces labor 
force participation. 
In initial stages of economic development, education levels typically increase much more for 
men than for women. Women’s wages and opportunities for work change relatively slowly while 
their husband’s income rises fast, so the negative income effect is likely to dominate any positive 
substitution effect of rising female wages. This is what drives reductions in FLFP according to the 
so-called Feminization-U hypothesis (Boserup 1970; Goldin 1994; Mammen and Paxson 2000; 
Gaddis and Klasen 2014).2 Participation is further reduced because of social stigma against women 
working outside of the home, especially in factory work, and the difficulty of combining household 
                                                 
2 Though the feminization-U is sometimes considered a stylized fact, the empirical evidence in support of it is mostly 
based on cross-country analysis, while panel analyses have produced mixed results (Tam 2011; Gaddis and Klasen 
2014). 
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production with market work in nonagricultural occupations; these effects are held to be 
particularly strong for married women.  
In later stages of development, women’s education starts to catch up to men’s, their earnings 
capacity increases and they gain access to socially acceptable types of work, especially if demand 
for white-collar workers increases with the expansion of the services sector. This will result in 
higher FLFP,3 but country-specific labor demand conditions clearly play a role in this process. The 
increase in FLFP could depend on growth in employment opportunities of the kind deemed 
appropriate for educated women, relative to growth in the educated working age population. 
Boserup (1970) describes how the feminization of clerical jobs proceeds very slowly when the 
number of educated men is in excess of demand for clerical workers. In those cases, there is likely 
to be considerable resistance against women’s employment in white-collar jobs, as this would 
reduce the opportunities for men (Boserup 1970: chapter 7). How the education-labor force 
participation link evolves over time will thus depend on the structure of labor demand growth in 
the economy and the status associated with different types of work.4 If female labor mobility is 
limited, as is the case in India, the growth in desirable jobs relative to the educated population can 
generate local mismatches with impacts on female labor force participation rates. 
One might further hypothesize that similar factors produce a U-shaped relationship between 
economic or educational status and women’s labor force participation at a given point in time 
within a country—as is indeed observed in India. Among the poorest with no or very little 
education, women are forced to work to survive, while among the very highly educated, high wages 
                                                 
3 Over the course of development, changes in circumstances may also be accompanied by changes in women’s 
behavior, i.e., the degree to which wages, income, and social restrictions affect FLFP. As Goldin (1990) describes the 
history of women’s work in the United States, economic development is reflected in an increasing own wage effect 
while women’s responsiveness to other family income declines. Blau and Kahn (2007) and Heim (2007) find similar 
evidence for women in the United States. 
4 A gender assessment for Pakistan (World Bank 2005) shows that the increase in urban female labor force participation 
in the 1990s was driven by an increased demand for teachers. But overall, still a much higher proportion of urban men 
than women are engaged in white-collar jobs.  
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induce women to work and stigmas militating against female employment in white-collar jobs that 
are open to highly educated women are low. Between these two groups, women face barriers to 
labor force participation related to both the absence of an urgent need to work (the income effect), 
and the presence of social stigmas associated with female employment in menial jobs. 
A correlation between education levels and labor force participation can also appear when both 
are outcomes of unobserved preferences for work (e.g., related to family background), such that 
women with a greater taste for work are more likely to attain higher education. Recent research has 
shown that primary and secondary school enrollment in India respond to the perceived returns to 
schooling, in particular, the availability and awareness of job opportunities in business and IT-
services (Jensen 2012; Shastry 2012; Oster and Millett Steinberg 2013). These studies also show, 
however, that responses are limited to very local opportunities and that girls’ schooling is affected 
by active recruitment rather than the mere availability of jobs (Jensen 2012). It apparently takes 
more than growth and rising wages to raise awareness of labor market opportunities, and despite 
its fast growth, the business services sector still accounts for only a small share of total employment 
in India. Nonetheless, when analyzing the effect of education on labor force participation it is 
important to keep in mind the potential endogeneity of education through nonrandom selection into 
education.  
Education could be endogenous to labor force participation in the exact opposite direction as 
well. In India, social restrictions on the lifestyles of women tend to become more rigid as 
households move up in the caste hierarchy (Chen and Drèze 1992). If education of women and 
restrictions on women’s mobility and work both increase with families’ social status, one would 
observe a negative correlation between education and labor force participation, at least for some 
levels of education. Eswaran et al. (2013) find supporting evidence for this negative endogeneity 
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channel in rural India (based on data for 1998–99), but Das and Desai (2003) find no support in a 
sample of rural and urban women in India in 1993–94.  
In all, major determinants of women’s labor force participation over the course of economic 
development are income, wages, and access to jobs deemed appropriate for women. Education 
levels shape female labor force participation partly through these channels. But women’s education 
is likely to reflect other, unobserved determinants as well. We analyze the role of education and 
other determinants in detail in our econometric analysis in Section III. First, Section II gives a 
descriptive analysis of the most important trends in the data. 
 
II. Female Labor Force Participation in Urban India 
The descriptions and empirical analysis in this paper are based on the so-called thick waves of the 
NSS Employment and Unemployment Survey, in 1987–88, 1993–94, 1999–2000, 2004–-05, 
2009–10, and 2011–12 (henceforth 1987, 1993, 1999, 2004, 2009, and 2011). This cross-sectional 
survey is the official source of nationally representative employment and earnings data used by the 
Government of India.  
Before discussing labor market developments in urban India in detail, Table A1.1 in appendix 
1 summarizes the trends in the female population and labor force for urban and rural India, for 
different age groups. Female population growth in the age group 15–64, and especially 25–54, 
exceeds total female population growth. Due to this demographic change, the female labor force 
has almost doubled in urban India and stayed constant in rural India, despite stagnating female 
labor force participation rates in urban India, and declining rates in rural India. In that sense, India 
is already benefitting from its demographic dividend related to a favorable age structure (although 
to a much lower extent than it would if more women were working). As still more than two-thirds 
of the Indian population lives in rural areas, the rural trend of declining participation rates dwarfs 
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the urban trend, so that overall female labor force participation declined from 22 percent in 1987 
to 17 percent in 2011. Note, however, that rural numbers are more likely to suffer from 
underreporting of women’s work in agricultural activities. 
In our analysis we focus on married women in urban India in the age group 25–54. Their labor 
force participation rate fell slightly from 18.5 percent in 1987 to 17.9 percent in 2011. Breaking 
down the labor force into different components, one can see in Figure 1 there has been little change 
in the different types of work and unemployment rates of married women, except for a peak in self-
employment and unpaid family work in 2004.5 Throughout the period, the labor force participation 
rate of urban married men in the same age group was stable at around 97 percent and hardly differs 
by education levels. 
 
Figure 1: Urban female labor force participation rate 
 
Note: Married women age 25-54. Self-employment includes employers and own account workers. Unpaid refers to 
unpaid family workers. Regular employees receive salary or wages on a regular basis. Casual workers receive a wage 
according to the terms of the daily or periodic work contract. Source: NSS Employment and Unemployment Survey 
 
                                                 
5 We always use the sampling weights provided. There is some question whether differences in sampling strategy 
between rounds might have a (slight) impact on the comparability of levels in the female labor force participation 
shown here, particularly also the peak reported in 2004–05.  As discussed above, however, they will not affect the 
observation of low levels, and the stability over time. For a discussion of these issues, see Klonner and Oldiges (2014).   
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Marriage is almost universal in India, with average age at marriage around 19 in urban India in 
2004–05 (Desai et al. 2010). According to the NSS survey data, the share of ever-married women 
among urban women age 25–54 was 95.3 percent in 2011 and 96.5 percent in 1987. Because in the 
age group 20–24 the marriage rate declined over time as more women pursue higher education and 
postpone marriage, we focus our analysis on women age 25 and older. We also exclude the 2 
percent of all married women in this age group who report being head of their household.6 
Female participation rates are calculated using women’s reported usual status, which refers to a 
reference period of 1 year in which the principal activity is the activity in which the respondent 
spent the majority of time. Subsidiary activity status is recorded as well but is not taken into account 
in our analysis, as it affects less than 5 percent of the adult urban female population and its 
definition is not consistent over time.7 Nonetheless, the pattern of female labor force participation 
is similar across different age groups, when including unmarried women, and when including labor 
force participation in both principal and subsidiary activities (see Table A1.1 in the appendix). 
One might worry that even though unpaid family workers and own account workers are 
considered part of the labor force, women’s work is underreported. Survey respondents may be 
reluctant to report women’s contributions to family businesses or may not consider a woman’s 
work to be different from her general domestic duties. This type of underreporting will mainly 
affect participation rates in rural areas, where women spent much more time on farm activities that 
are less likely to be considered as work, and will affect subsidiary status activities more than 
principal status activities because the former includes work done for only a few hours per day or 
during peak season only, etc. Principal status participation rates in urban India are arguably least 
                                                 
6 We exclude them because we are interested in the role of women’s own versus household head education, among 
others. Participation rates of female household heads are higher, and declined from 39 percent in 1987 to 30 percent 
in 2011.  
7 Before the 2004 wave, there was no lower bound on the number of hours spent on a particular activity to be 
considered as subsidiary activity, but in 2004 the minimum was set at 30 days of the reference year. 
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affected by underreporting of women’s work but have the disadvantage that women working part 
time are not considered as active in the labor force if they spend the majority of their time in 
domestic duties. This is important to keep in mind, but as noted above this affects at most 5 percent 
of the sample and does not affect time trends.  
To provide some verification of participation rates from the NSS Employment and 
Unemployment Survey using other data, we compare the 2004-05 numbers to the 2004-05 wave 
of the India Human Development Survey (Desai et al. 2009). There is no major time criterion to 
be considered as a worker in the IHDS survey, and there is considerably more probing as 
respondents are asked to specify each household member’s contribution to each family business as 
well as any other activities earning an income or a wage.8 For married women in urban India in the 
age group 25–54, the IHDS data show an employment rate (unemployment is not recorded) of 19.8 
percent, which is very close to 19.6 percent based on the NSS data. The participation rate for 
married women in urban Delhi is also very similar between the NSS 2004–05 wave (19.4 percent) 
and a survey done for a study on women’s work in 2006 (19 percent; see Sudarshan and 
Bhattacharya 2009).  
Figure 2 shows that the urban FLFP rate has a U-shaped relationship with education and that 
the stagnation in FLFP hides a combination of rising participation among women with low 
education and a decline in participation rates of highly educated women. As income, wages, and 
access to different types of jobs are important candidates for explaining these patterns, we now turn 
to a brief discussion of those.  
 
Figure 2: Urban female labor force participation rate by education level 
                                                 
8 See http://ihds.umd.edu/questionnaires.html for the IHDS household questionnaires. 
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Note: Married women age 25-54. Education is the highest level completed, see appendix Table A1.2 for definitions. 
Source: NSS Employment and Unemployment Survey.  
 
In line with India’s high growth rates, earnings data form the NSS surveys show that real wages 
roughly doubled between 1987 and 2011 (see Fig. A1.1 in the appendix). In absolute terms, real 
wages increased almost equally for men and women, but the ratio of male to female average weekly 
earnings declined from 1.6 in 1987 to 1.3 in 2011. Given the very high participation rates of married 
men in this age group and their higher average wages, one can safely assume that most women in 
urban India are secondary earners. Rising earnings of men most likely had a strong negative impact 
on female labor force participation. But with women’s wages increasing more than men’s, positive 
substitution effects could at least partly offset the negative impact of men’s income.  
However, patterns in the data suggest there is no close link between women’s wages and their 
labor force participation. Figure 3 shows women’s real wages by education level. Returns to 
secondary and graduate education are high and rising, especially returns to graduate education.  
Real wages at lower levels of schooling, on the other hand, show a strong convergence due to 
relatively fast wage growth of illiterate women. If anything, own wage effects would thus have led 
to increases in labor force participation rates at both the ends of the educational distribution—for 
illiterate women on the one side and highly educated women on the other side. Going back to 
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Figure 2, however, we see that these are exactly the groups of women for whom participation rates 
declined. 
 
Figure 3: Log real wages for women age 25-54 by education level, urban India 
 
Note: Wages are average total weekly earnings for casual and regular employees. Earnings are spatially deflated and 
in 1987-88 Rupees, based on the Labour Bureau Consumer Price Index for Industrial Workers and Deaton (2003). 
Source: NSS Employment and Unemployment Survey 
 
Wages may have little impact on FLFP, despite rising returns to higher education, if 
employment growth in the activities appropriate for educated women is limited. As shown in Figure 
4, the distribution of female workers across industries changes substantially with education. The 
distribution is shown separately for women below secondary education and those with secondary 
or higher education. Women with lower education work mainly in agriculture, manufacturing, and 
domestic services (included in “other services”). Access to white-collar services sector jobs is 
mostly confined to women with at least secondary education, but declined steeply over time. By 
and large, this pattern is consistent with the U-shape in education suggesting that only with at least 
secondary education, women gain access to jobs that are not subject to social stigma. It could also 
account for the declining participation rates of highly educated women whose supply increased 
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much faster than available jobs, thereby reducing employment opportunities for them in these 
sectors. 
 
Figure 4: Distribution of urban female workforce across industries, by education 
 
Note: Distribution of female workers across industries, including employees, self-employed and unpaid family 
workers. Shares are in percentage of all female workers in the respective education group. Low education is below 
secondary schooling; high education is secondary or higher. Source: NSS Employment and Unemployment Survey. 
 
In 1987 the vast majority of highly educated women worked in public administration, education, 
and health. This share declined to 50 percent in 2011, mainly driven by a declining share of public 
administration. Although financial and business services have become more important, they still 
account for only a small fraction of female employment. Consequently, highly educated women 
are increasingly working in industries such as manufacturing (mostly in textiles), wholesale and 
retail trade, and domestic services; within these sectors, many highly educated women work in 
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professional and administrative occupations so that there are still white-collar occupations.9 For 
low-educated women, employment has shifted from agriculture into food and tobacco, textiles, 
construction, and domestic services.10  
The changing industrial distribution of workers is consistent with Boserup’s (1970) description 
of white-collar jobs becoming increasingly scarce when education levels grow rapidly. The 
distribution of male workers (not shown) confirms that the share of white-collar services 
employment has declined not just for women but for the entire labor force, while employment 
growth has been concentrated largely in construction and retail and wholesale trade. At the same 
time, educational attainment has indeed grown rapidly. The share of women with at least secondary 
education grew from 21 percent in 1987 to 45 percent in 2011. Among men, this share increased 
from 38 to 56 percent over the same period (for more detail, see Fig. A1.2 in appendix 1). Besides 
rising incomes, this growing supply of highly educated workers combined with employment 
shifting toward less skill-intensive sectors could be an important reason why participation rates 
among highly educated women have declined. 
 
III. Estimating the Determinants of Women’s Labor Force Participation 
Using the NSS survey data, we test how the different factors discussed above have contributed 
to the stagnation of FLFP in urban India. We first estimate the effect of education, income, and 
other variables on women’s labor force participation in a reduced form labor supply model. In the 
next section, a decomposition analysis is used to show how changes in the explanatory variables 
                                                 
9 Due to changes in the occupational classification used in the NSS data, we cannot construct a consistent definition of 
white-collar occupations over time. We do find that in all sectors, highly educated women are more likely to work in 
professional and administrative occupations than women with less than secondary education.  
10 Domestic services could be considered appropriate for women, but they are typically not covered by existing 
legislation and are relatively easy victims of exploitation due to their invisibility, lack of education and, often, 
migration background (NCEUS 2007). 
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and changes in coefficients and unobservables contributed to the stagnation of FLFP between 1987 
and 2011. 
The probability of woman i in year t (1987, 1999, 2004, 2009, and 2011)11 being in the labor 
force (including self-employment, unpaid family work, regular and casual wage employment, and 
unemployment) is modeled as 
𝑃𝑖𝑡 = 𝐹(𝛼𝑠𝑡 +  ∑ 𝛽𝑡
𝐸  𝐷𝑖𝑡
𝐸
𝐸 +  𝛽𝑋𝑡 𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽𝑍𝑡 𝑍𝑖𝑡) ,    (1) 
where F is the standard normal cumulative distribution function. The model is estimated separately 
for each year to allow for changes in behavior over time.  
The first right-hand side term is a state fixed effect. Education is measured through dummies 
for the highest education level completed, DE (E=2, …, 6), with illiterate (E=1) as the reference 
level. 𝑋𝑖𝑡 is a vector of explanatory variables at the individual and household level, including 
household income excluding her own earnings, and education of the household head. Income is 
measured as total household earnings in the reference week excluding the woman’s own earnings.12 
We use income per capita to control for differences in the number of people depending on that 
income.13 Instead of an asset index or similar measure of wealth, the education level of the 
household head is included to capture household wealth or permanent income beyond total 
earnings. If higher socioeconomic status leads to more restrictions on women and if greater wealth 
reduces the need for women to work, the education level of the household head should have a 
                                                 
11 Data for 1993 are not used in the econometric analysis because the 1993 data do not contain district identifiers, 
which are needed to construct district-level explanatory variables. Districts are administrative units at the substate level 
in India. Our sample covers 362 districts across India’s 18 main states. 
12 For total household earnings, the earnings of self-employed household members are imputed based on the earnings 
of employees. Although this is a fairly rough approximation, it appears this imputation serves the purpose of measuring 
household income well: results are very similar when households with at least one self-employed adult are excluded 
from the sample. 
13 Data on other income sources are not collected in the survey, nor are household assets. 
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strong negative effect on participation. We also control for the security of household income 
through an indicator for having at least one male household member with salaried employment.14 
Further individual controls are age, age squared, number of children, and social group 
(indicators for scheduled caste and tribe – SCTS –, non-SCST Hindu, Muslim, and other). These 
caste and religion dummies are included to capture direct impacts of culturally or religiously 
determined restrictions on women, which are expected to be strongest among Muslim and high-
caste Hindu households (Chen and Drèze 1992; Das and Desai 2003).  
𝑍𝑖𝑡 is a vector of local labor demand and supply variables, included to capture the effect of the 
availability of suitable or attractive jobs. We include the district share of male workers in 
agriculture15, industry, construction, white-collar services (financial and business services, public 
administration, education, health, and social work), and other services; and the share of the district 
working age population with a graduate degree, to control for the local supply of high-skilled labor. 
We expect that female participation is higher in districts that are relatively specialized in white-
collar services. The relative supply of graduates in the district is expected to depress participation 
rates through a crowding-out effect. These factors are expected to be particularly important for 
highly educated women.  
Standard labor supply models would also include the woman’s own wage, but identification of 
own-wage effects is challenging. To estimate the effect of wages on labor force participation it is 
necessary to use predicted wages for workers and non-workers, corrected for selection into 
employment and predicted based on at least one exogenous variable (for a discussion see Heim 
                                                 
14 Households, especially in developing countries, can use women’s labor supply to deal with negative income shocks 
or uncertainty (Attanasio et al. 2005; Bhalotra and Umaña-Aponte 2010). Implicit in the empirical model is the 
assumption that women’s participation decision is made conditional on men’s: we do not consider joint utility 
maximization or bargaining within the household. Given the very high and unresponsive labor force participation rates 
of men, we believe that this assumption is warranted. 
15 Employment shares are measured within urban areas of districts, but even in urban areas, households engage in 
agricultural and livestock production. 
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2007). Following leading studies in the literature (Blau and Kahn 2007; Heim 2007), we estimate 
two different specifications to identify the own-wage effect. One exploits wage variation across 
districts, the other exploits wage variation across state-age-education groups. The two sources of 
variation give very different estimates, which do not allow us to draw firm conclusions about the 
impact of wages on women’s labor force participation. However, the estimated effects of other 
explanatory variables, including education, are robust to the different specifications and to 
excluding the own wage from the model.16 Given the difficulties in identifying the own wage effect 
and the inability to include the self-employed in models that include own wages, we focus here on 
the results without including own-wage effects. Results for own-wage estimates and more details 
of the estimation method are discussed in appendix 2. 
Table 1 contains sample means for all variables.  The largest changes over time are increasing 
education (women’s own education levels and those of their male partners and household heads, 
as well as the district population share with graduate level education) , fertility decline, and 
increasing household income. Further note that employment has shifted over time from agriculture, 
manufacturing, and white-collar services to construction and other services. To explore in more 
detail to what extent the determinants of labor force participation differ between low- and highly 
educated women, equation (1) is also estimated separately for women with less than secondary 
education and women with secondary or higher education. 
 
 
Estimation Results 
                                                 
16 The level of the own education effects does change but in all specifications we find a strong U-shape and a large 
decline in the effect of secondary and graduate education over time.  
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Estimation results are reported in Table 2 as average marginal effects, showing the change in 
the probability of being in the labor force associated with a unit change in the explanatory variable 
(for categorical variables this is the difference with the reference category). First of all, the U-shape 
in education appears even stronger in the marginal effects than in the average unconditional 
participation rates in Figure 2. Even conditional on variables that could have explained the 
unconditional U, such as partner’s income and education, caste, or religion, participation declines 
as education increases up to intermediate levels.  
 
Table 1. Sample Means 
 1987 1999 2004 2009 2011 
Labor force 0.18 0.18 0.20 0.17 0.18 
Illiterate 0.42 0.32 0.28 0.23 0.22 
Literate 0.11 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.07 
Primary 0.15 0.12 0.13 0.12 0.11 
Middle 0.11 0.14 0.16 0.15 0.15 
Secondary 0.14 0.20 0.22 0.26 0.27 
Graduate 0.07 0.13 0.14 0.17 0.18 
      
Log income 3.63 3.99 4.08 4.36 4.47 
Salaried employment 0.52 0.48 0.46 0.46 0.46 
      
Hh head Illiterate 0.21 0.18 0.16 0.15 0.14 
Hh head Literate < prim. 0.14 0.10 0.10 0.08 0.08 
Hh head Primary 0.17 0.12 0.13 0.11 0.11 
Hh head Middle 0.14 0.15 0.16 0.15 0.16 
Hh head Secondary 0.22 0.26 0.28 0.30 0.29 
Hh head Graduate 0.13 0.18 0.18 0.21 0.22 
      
Hindu non-SCST 0.66 0.65 0.65 0.66 0.65 
SCST 0.14 0.17 0.17 0.16 0.16 
Muslim 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.15 
Other  social group 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.04 
Age 35.6 36.1 36.6 36.7 36.8 
Children 0–4 0.69 0.53 0.50 0.42 0.39 
Children 5–14 1.59 1.37 1.20 1.05 1.05 
      
Agriculture 0.07 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.05 
Construction 0.07 0.10 0.10 0.12 0.12 
Manufacturing 0.27 0.23 0.24 0.22 0.23 
White-collar services 0.20 0.18 0.18 0.19 0.19 
Other services 0.38 0.43 0.43 0.41 0.41 
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Graduate share 0.11 0.16 0.17 0.21 0.22 
 
N 29031 32541 29513 27198 27306 
Note: Averages for married women age 25–54, calculated using sampling weights.  
Source: NSS Employment and Unemployment Survey 
 
A remaining channel—one not captured in control variables—is through social stigma. It is 
possible that the stigma associated with low-skilled jobs (including in agriculture, menial jobs in 
manufacturing and construction, or in domestic services) increases as women attain low and 
intermediate levels of education. This means education is associated with an increased (fixed) 
utility cost of engaging in low-skilled work. This channel can also explain the upward sloping part 
of the education U-curve: once women attain secondary or post-secondary education, the utility 
cost disappears as they gain access to white-collar jobs that are not subject to social stigma. In all, 
the education U-curve conditional on income, social status, and the sectoral structure of 
employment (which we further discuss below) can be explained by social stigma associated with 
different types of jobs. 
In addition, the positive effects of higher education could reflect higher wages or positive 
selection effects. As we find very similar estimates when controlling for the own wage, we think 
the own wage channel does not play an important role, despite high returns to education in the 
labor market. On the other hand, it is quite plausible that the positive higher education effect partly 
reflects an upward bias due to endogenous selection into higher education of girls with stronger 
labor market orientation. This would not only bias upwards the effects of higher education, but is 
also consistent with the large decline in the positive effects of secondary and graduate education 
over time. If increasing educational attainment has been driven by the growing supply of education, 
for example, highly educated women in 1987 were more positively selected than those in 2011. 
We cannot test this directly without modeling educational attainment itself, which is beyond the 
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scope of this paper, but we provide suggestive evidence for a decline in positive selection in Section 
V. 
Moving down in Table 2, we find a negative income effect as expected. Security of income 
(male salaried employment) also reduces women’s labor force participation, and we find a 
particularly strong negative effect of education of the household head. The size of the effects 
declines over time, suggesting that women have become less responsive to income insecurity and 
to overall socioeconomic status of the household. Household head education effects remain, 
however, quantitatively large.  
 
Table 2. Estimation Results (Average Marginal Effects) 
Pr (Labor force) 1987 1999 2004 2009 2011 
Own education (Ref. = Illiterate):    
 Literate -0.050*** -0.063*** -0.051*** -0.030** -0.026*   
 (0.009) (0.011) (0.013) (0.014) (0.014)    
 Primary -0.072*** -0.074*** -0.062*** -0.025** -0.027*   
 (0.008) (0.011) (0.015) (0.012) (0.014)    
 Middle -0.067*** -0.084*** -0.100*** -0.060*** -0.064*** 
 (0.011) (0.009) (0.013) (0.013) (0.011)    
 Secondary 0.086*** -0.020* -0.048*** -0.056*** -0.041*** 
 (0.013) (0.010) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)    
 Graduate 0.324*** 0.217*** 0.144*** 0.131*** 0.151*** 
 (0.020) (0.018) (0.023) (0.019) (0.022)    
      
 Log income -0.034*** -0.017*** -0.032*** -0.028*** -0.022*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)    
 Male salaried emp. -0.022*** -0.032*** -0.019** 0.002 -0.005    
 (0.007) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010)    
Household head education (Ref. = Illiterate):   
 Literate -0.067*** -0.045** -0.040** -0.025 0.017    
 (0.012) (0.020) (0.017) (0.018) (0.019)    
 Primary -0.107*** -0.078*** -0.053*** -0.035** -0.057*** 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.015) (0.014) (0.018)    
 Middle -0.126*** -0.115*** -0.078*** -0.072*** -0.083*** 
 (0.013) (0.011) (0.014) (0.014) (0.015)    
 Secondary -0.170*** -0.150*** -0.121*** -0.095*** -0.103*** 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.015) (0.015)    
Graduate -0.166*** -0.154*** -0.110*** -0.084*** -0.126*** 
 (0.016) (0.014) (0.018) (0.017) (0.019)    
Social group (Ref. = Hindu non-SCST):    
 SCST 0.089*** 0.054*** 0.036*** 0.059*** 0.033*** 
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 (0.010) (0.011) (0.013) (0.014) (0.009)    
 Muslim -0.058*** -0.069*** -0.086*** -0.087*** -0.082*** 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.014) (0.012) (0.011)    
 Other   0.021 0.013 0.004 0.022 0.039**  
 (0.015) (0.017) (0.013) (0.015) (0.018)    
      
 Age 0.020*** 0.026*** 0.027*** 0.016*** 0.014*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004)    
 Age2 -0.0003*** -0.0003*** -0.0004*** -0.0002*** -0.0002*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)    
Continues on next page. 
 
 
Table 2 continued 
Pr (Labor force) 1987 1999 2004 2009 2011 
 Children 0–4 -0.022*** -0.018*** -0.024*** -0.036*** -0.039*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.007) (0.008)    
 Children 5–14 -0.005** -0.001 0.008** -0.003 0.007*   
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)    
District male employment shares (Ref. = construction):  
 Agriculture 0.255* 0.171* 0.165 -0.008 0.220**  
 (0.132) (0.097) (0.116) (0.108) (0.096)    
 Manufacturing 0.073 -0.097 -0.039 0.155* 0.268*** 
 (0.118) (0.087) (0.099) (0.091) (0.077)    
 Services -0.048 -0.090 -0.015 0.120 0.014    
 (0.121) (0.084) (0.093) (0.088) (0.073)    
 White-collar serv. -0.036 -0.022 -0.086 0.170 0.052    
 (0.124) (0.099) (0.120) (0.106) (0.100)    
      
 District grad. share 0.004 -0.087 0.017 -0.402*** -0.051    
 (0.111) (0.083) (0.105) (0.091) (0.082)    
      
N 29031 32541 29513 27198 27306    
Pseudo R2 0.145 0.126 0.125 0.114 0.097 
FLFP rate 0.185 0.179 0.203 0.174 0.179 
Note: Married women age 25–54. All estimations include state fixed effects. District-clustered standard errors in 
parentheses, *** p < .01, ** p < .05, * p < .10. 
 
Looking at the social group variables, we find that women in SCST households are most likely 
to work, but the gap between SCST and non-SCST Hindus declined.17 The impact of religion 
                                                 
17 From 1999 onwards, the NSS data also distinguish Other Backward Class (OBC) households. Including a separate 
category for OBC—rather than including them in the reference non-SCST group—we find that OBC women have 
higher FLFP than high caste Hindus in 1999 and 2004, but there is no difference in 2009 and 2011. The estimated gap 
between SCST and high caste Hindus is somewhat larger but still declines over time. 
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appears stronger, with Muslim women 6 to almost 9 percentage points less likely to work than non-
SCST Hindus; a difference close to half the female labor force participation rate.  
Women’s age and the presence of children in the household have the expected effects. 
Participation first increases and then declines with age. We see that the age profile shifted 
somewhat after 2004, reducing the peak age from around 40 in 1987–2004 to around 35 years in 
2011. At the same time, the negative effect of young children almost doubled in magnitude. Though 
the estimates cannot be interpreted as causal due to joint fertility and participation decisions, we 
clearly see an increasing negative association between women working and the presence of young 
children in the household. 
The bottom of the table shows the estimated effects of district demand and supply variables.18 
We do not find that local supply of high-skilled workers affects FLFP much, except for a strong 
negative effect in 2009. This could reflect the impact of the global financial crisis, which led to 
substantial declines in employment (see for example Kucera et al., 2012). Regarding the sectoral 
structure of employment, in 1987 and 1999 FLFP was highest in districts where agriculture makes 
up a higher share of urban employment suggesting that agricultural activities in and at the fringes 
of cities generate higher employment opportunities for women. Manufacturing has started drawing 
in more women since 2009. Surprisingly, the employment shares of white-collar services and other 
services are not significantly positively related to FLFP.  
Subsample estimates (reported in Tables A1.3 and A1.4 in the appendix) shed more light on 
this. In the low-education sample, we see the strong association of FLFP with agricultural 
employment in the early years and again in 2011. This same pattern is not present for highly 
educated women. The negative effect of high-skilled labor supply is much stronger in the high-
                                                 
18 If we replace the district-level variables and state fixed effects by district fixed effects, results are virtually 
unchanged. These results are available on request.   
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education sample, where it remains significantly negative (though smaller in magnitude) in 2011. 
We also find a positive effect of white-collar services in the high-education sample, but it is 
significant only in 2009. It appears that 2009 was characterized by fiercer competition for skilled 
jobs, and only districts with a large share of employment in white-collar services could keep highly 
educated women in the labor force. By 2011, the crowding out effect is weaker and at the same 
time, highly educated women are shifting more toward the manufacturing sector, similar to the 
low-education sample.  
There are other important differences between the two education groups. First of all, the negative 
income effect in the high-education sample halves between 1987 and 2009 and disappears in 2011, 
as opposed to a slight increase in the low-education sample. Second, education of the household 
head has a strong negative effect in the low-education sample, but no effect on highly educated 
women in any of the years. Third, male salaried employment—our proxy for income security—is 
associated with lower labor force participation of women with low education, while the opposite 
is found for highly educated women (though for both subsamples, the effect declines in magnitude 
and is no longer statistically significant in 2011). These results suggest that highly educated women 
are less constrained by family circumstances in their labor force participation decision, while 
women with less than secondary education appear to be boxed in by necessity to work if household 
incomes are very low or insecure, and stigmas attached to working if they have some education 
and are in more secure economic environments. The finding that manufacturing employment is 
nowadays associated with higher FLFP is an indication that manufacturing jobs are becoming less 
stigmatized. 
Regarding changes in participation rates over time, it follows from the probit estimates that the 
increase in women’s educational attainment and fertility decline should have translated into higher 
labor force participation. Working in the opposite direction, however, is the increase in educational 
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attainment of men and the increase in male incomes. Changes in the structure of employment also 
appear to have contributed to lower participation rates. The employment shares of agriculture, 
manufacturing, and white-collar services declined, while these are the sectors positively associated 
with FLFP. The decomposition analysis in Section IV quantifies the contributions of changes in 
the different covariates included in the model. Before turning to those results, we first discuss the 
potential influence of migration on our estimation results. 
 
The Potential Role of Rural-Urban Migration 
Rural to urban migration is an important part of India’s development process. The population 
numbers in appendix table A1.1 show that the total female population grew by 50 percent in the 
period 1987-2011, comprising a 91 percent growth of females in urban India and 38 percent growth 
in rural India. Rural-urban migrants are typically not a random selection of the rural population, so 
one might worry that the stagnation of urban FLFP and the changes in labor force participation 
determinants are driven by the inflow of migrants. 
The National Sample Survey Organisation (NSSO) integrated the collection of migration data 
with the employment surveys in 1987 and 1999 but not with those of 2004 and after. In 1987 and 
1999, almost 70 percent of women in our sample have a migration background, of which almost 
60 percent (i.e., around 40% of the total female urban sample) migrated from a rural area. The most 
important reason for migration is marriage (about 65 percent of all female migrants). On average, 
rural-urban migrants are more likely to be at either end of the education distribution (illiterate or 
with at least secondary education) than nonmigrants, and less likely to have low or intermediate 
educational attainment (see Fig. A1.3 in the appendix). Given the U-shaped relationship between 
education and labor force participation, the compositional impact of migration should have been to 
increase urban FLFP, if anything. But despite the large share of migrants and differences in 
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educational attainment, controlling for rural-urban migration background in the 1987 and 1999 
estimations has no impact on the results. The migrant variable itself has no significant effect on 
labor force participation. Results are also unchanged if we add dummies for both the woman’s and 
her spouse’s migration background and their interaction, which captures the difference between 
women migrating to join their husbands’ family versus families migrating jointly. Even if we drop 
all rural-urban migrants from the sample, the results do not change.19 
Unfortunately, no migration data was collected in the employment surveys after 1999, but the 
NSSO does provide descriptive statistics on migrants from a special migration survey conducted 
in 2007–08 (NSSO 2010). Based on these statistics we find that the educational attainment 
differences between urban female migrants and the total urban female population have been quite 
stable between 1987–88 and 2007–08. In other words, the educational composition of female 
migrants has not changed differently from the educational composition of the entire urban female 
population. We are therefore fairly confident that changes in female migration patterns are not 
driving the stagnation of FLFP.  
 
IV. Decomposition Analysis 
In order to quantify the contribution of different explanatory variables to the observed change—
or lack thereof—in the female labor force participation rate, we now turn to a decomposition 
analysis, using the probit estimates for 1987 and 2011. Following Fairlie’s (2006) extension of the 
Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition (Blinder 1973; Oaxaca 1973), the labor force participation equation 
(Eqn. 1) is expressed as 𝑌𝑖
𝑡 = 𝐹(𝑋𝑖
𝑡𝛽𝑡), resulting in the following decomposition:  
?̅?11 − ?̅?87 ≈  [∑
𝐹(𝑋𝑖
11𝛽87)
𝑁11
𝑁11
𝑖  − ∑
𝐹(𝑋𝑖
87𝛽87)
𝑁87
𝑁87
𝑖 ] +  [∑
𝐹(𝑋𝑖
11𝛽11)
𝑁11
𝑁11
𝑖  − ∑
𝐹(𝑋𝑖
11𝛽87)
𝑁11
𝑁11
𝑖 ].   (2) 
                                                 
19 Detailed results for this section are available on request. 
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The Nt are sample sizes and ?̅?𝑡 the sample average probability of being in the labor force.20  The 
first right-hand side term in (2) measures the contribution of changes in covariates, evaluated at 
1987 coefficients. It measures how changes in covariates would have translated into changes in 
FLFP if coefficients and unobservables had remained at their start-of-period (1987) levels. The 
second term is the remaining change, which measures the change in FLFP that would have resulted 
from changes in coefficients and unobservables if covariates had been constant at their end-of-
period (2011) levels.  
The contribution of a single explanatory variable is computed using a counterfactual predicted 
participation rate, by replacing only this particular variable, say 𝑋1𝑖
87, by its 2011 counterpart 𝑋1𝑖
11, 
while keeping all other variables at their 1987 values. This is done by drawing a 2011 subsample 
of size equal to the 1987 sample, matching women on their predicted probability of working (based 
on a pooled probit estimation), and assigning women in the 2011 subsample the value of 𝑋1 
observed for their 1987 match. The results reported below are based on 1000 random subsamples, 
in which furthermore the order of variables is randomized to account for the fact the contribution 
of one variable depends on the value of other variables.21 
The decomposition analysis can also be carried out with covariate contributions measured at 
2011 coefficients, and coefficient contributions measured at 1987 covariate levels, using the 
following expression: 
?̅?11 − ?̅?87 ≈  [∑
𝐹(𝑋𝑖
011𝛽11)
𝑁11
𝑁11
𝑖  − ∑
𝐹(𝑋𝑖
87𝛽11)
𝑁87
𝑁87
𝑖 ] +  [∑
𝐹(𝑋𝑖
87𝛽11)
𝑁87
𝑁87
𝑖  − ∑
𝐹(𝑋𝑖
87𝛽87)
𝑁87
𝑁87
𝑖 ].  (3) 
If coefficients and covariates changed substantially from 1987 to 2011, which is the case for a 
number of variables, measured contributions will differ between (2) and (3). We therefore report 
                                                 
20 The equality in equation (2) does not hold exactly for the probit model, because the average value of predicted 
probabilities does not equal the average of the dependent variable. It is a close approximation, however, and we find 
very similar results when we use a logit model instead (for which the equality does hold exactly, see Fairlie [2006]).  
21 See Fairlie (2006) for a more detailed discussion of the method. 
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results for both choices of reference year. The “true” contribution of a variable will lie somewhere 
in between, and of course this type of decomposition is an accounting exercise, ignoring the fact 
that changes in covariates and changes in coefficients are interdependent.  
Table 3 shows the decomposition results. In our sample of married women 25–59, the female 
labor force participation rate declined by 0.6 percentage points between 1987 and 2011. At 1987 
coefficients (Eqn. 2), covariate changes account for a 0.3 percentage point decline. The remaining 
0.2 percentage point is accounted for by changes in coefficients and unobservables. At 2011 
coefficients (Eqn. 3), we find a much larger negative contribution from covariate changes, which 
is almost entirely offset by a large positive contribution from changing coefficients and 
unobservables.  
 
Table 3. Decomposition of FLFP, 1987–2011 
Pr (labor force) 1987  0.185 (N=29031)    
Pr (labor force) 2011 0.179 (N=27306)    
Difference -0.006      
 
 At 1987 coefficients  At 2011 coefficients 
  Contribution SE  Contribution SE 
Own education 0.047*** 0.003  0.011*** 0.003 
Log income -0.030*** 0.002  -0.020*** 0.003 
Male salaried emp. 0.001** 0.000  0.000 0.000 
Education household head -0.025*** 0.002  -0.021*** 0.002 
Caste and religion 0.001*** 0.000  0.000 0.001 
Age 0.001*** 0.000  0.000 0.001 
Children 0.009*** 0.001  0.007** 0.003 
District employment shares -0.011*** 0.003  -0.019*** 0.004 
District graduate share 0.001 0.008  -0.006 0.007 
State dummies 0.003*** 0.001  0.003*** 0.001 
Total covariates -0.003   -0.045  
Coefficients & unobservables -0.002   0.039  
Note: SE = standard error.  *** p < .01, ** p < .05. 
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The variable-specific covariate contributions show that the increase in women’s education levels 
and declining numbers of children account for an increase in participation rates.22 These effects are 
offset, however, by negative contributions from rising household incomes, education of household 
heads, and the change in the sectoral structure of employment. The probit estimation results 
indicated that only agricultural and manufacturing employment are associated with significantly 
higher female labor force participation rates, but both sectors’ shares in employment declined over 
time. This sectoral change alone can account for a 1 to 2 percentage point reduction in FLFP. The 
negative contributions of household income and household head education are larger, but because 
women have become less responsive to income and household head education, they account for a 
smaller decline in FLFP at 2011 coefficients than at 1987 coefficients. 
The total covariate contribution is negative and much larger at 2011 coefficients. Sensitivity 
with respect to the choice of reference year is mainly due to the contribution of women’s education: 
at 1987 coefficients, increasing education accounts for an increase in FLFP of 4.7 percentage 
points, while at 2011 coefficients the contribution is only 1.1 percentage points. This implies that 
FLFP would have increased by 3 percentage points (rather than decline by 0.6 percentage points) 
if educational attainment had increased without the effect of education declining. The remainder 
of this paper is devoted to a further analysis of precisely this declining effect of higher education. 
 
 
V. The Declining Effect of Higher Education on Labor Force Participation 
As discussed in Section III, the effect of higher education on women’s labor force participation 
could partly reflect an upward selection bias, where completing education and joining the labor 
                                                 
22 The positive contribution of state dummies suggests that growth of the urban female population was higher in 
states with higher FLFP rates. This could be due to migration: either migration from low-FLFP states to high-FLFP 
states, or stronger urbanization within high-FLFP states. 
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force are both outcomes of some unobservable determinants. Examples of such unobserved 
determinants could be the education or labor force participation of mothers, influences of peers, or 
a more general preference for work that motivates both higher education and labor force 
participation.  This selection effect might change over time.  If the average woman completing 
secondary or higher education in 2011 is less positively selected than her 1987 counterpart, this 
could potentially account for the declining effects of secondary and graduate education between 
1987 and 2011.23 A detailed analysis of the determinants of women’s educational attainment would 
require data on women’s parental background and on schooling supply and other characteristics of 
the location where they grew up. Unfortunately, those data are not available, as we only observe 
married women in their husband’s household—which is often in a different area than where they 
grew up—and have no information on their location of origin or on their parents’ education and 
employment. The following section provides supporting evidence, however, for the empirical 
relevance of the selection channel, which is also consistent with an analysis by cohorts we discuss 
next. 
Among the factors that could explain a decrease in positive selection are the increasing supply 
of education and rising marriage market returns to education: both would be reasons for women to 
pursue more education even in absence of expected labor market returns and unrelated to the 
unobservable propensity to join the labor force. Given the high pace of expansion of schooling 
supply, it is likely that highly educated women in 2011 are less positively selected than highly 
educated women in 1987.24  
                                                 
23 Another explanation would be a decline in the quality of education. Azam and Kingdon (2013) study gender bias in 
education expenditure and show that in the period 1993–2005, when girls’ education caught up to boys’, households 
still spent less on girls, primarily by sending girls to public schools and boys to private schools. Girls are thus likely to 
receive lower quality schooling than boys, even if they attain the same level of education. Unfortunately we do not 
observe the type of institution a woman attended or any other indicator of the quality of education in the NSS data. 
24 As discussed in Section 2 some recent studies show that (girls’) enrollment responds to the growth of jobs in IT and 
IT enabled services (Jensen 2012; Shastry 2012; Oster and Millett Steinberg 2013), but this is a very recent 
development and this sector still accounts for a very small share of employment. We are not aware of any research on 
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Besides an expansion in the supply of education, rising marriage market returns to women’s 
education could be driving women to pursue higher education. Marriage is of great importance in 
India, especially to women and their parents (Anderson 2003), as women typically leave their 
parental household and migrate to live with their husband’s family (see Rosenzweig and Stark 
1989; Banerjee et al. 2013). Despite a growing literature on women’s earnings capacity and their 
bargaining power within marriage in developing countries (e.g. Luke and Munshi 2011), there is 
little evidence on the marriage market returns to women’s education. According to Anderson 
(2003), the most important quality of women on the marriage market in India is a good appearance, 
while for men their ability to earn a living is most important. Data for India in Banerjee et al. (2013) 
show both men and women have a preference for marrying a highly educated spouse, though their 
sample includes only educated persons from the urban middle-class in West Bengal. Rising labor 
market returns to education would be an obvious reason why men prefer more educated women. 
However, even in absence of labor market returns, women’s education can contribute to husbands’ 
social status directly and through higher productivity in status production (Eswaran et al. 2013). 
Another important channel could be increased productivity of maternal time in the production of 
child human capital (Lam and Duryea 1999), which raises the demand for educated wives if labor 
market returns to men’s education increase (Behrman et al. 1999).  
In Klasen and Pieters (2013) we show that marriage market returns to education became 
significantly more convex between 1987 and 2009. In 2009 women needed at least secondary 
education to have a reasonable chance of marrying a highly educated and high-earning spouse. In 
contrast, primary school and certainly middle school generated reasonable odds to attract a high-
                                                 
the causal effect of education on women’s labor force participation in India or on the impact of rapidly increasing 
schooling supply on women’s educational attainment, other than evaluations of recent policies and programs for 
primary education and a growing literature on higher education quota for low-caste men and women (e.g., Bertrand et 
al. 2010; Kingdon 2007). 
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quality spouse in 1987. This is consistent with our claim that at least some of the female education 
expansion is driven by expected marriage market returns rather than labor market returns. 
 
 
 
Selection Bias in the Effects of Education 
 Without instruments for educational attainment we cannot control for selection into education, 
but the extreme case—assuming that the education effects capture endogenous selection only—
can be used to estimate an upper bound on the contribution of changes in selection to changes in 
the estimated effects of education. For simplicity, suppose there is one unobservable characteristic 
that determines labor force participation, and let us call this ability. Assume there is perfect sorting 
on ability into education, the ability distribution in the population is fixed, and there are k different 
ability levels in the population with k = 1, …, 6 (one could also think of a uniform distribution of 
ability, but the idea remains the same). We thus have six ability types with corresponding ability 
level 𝑎𝑘, increasing in k.  
Taking 1987 as our benchmark year, the 1987 distribution of education (E = 1, …, 6) 
corresponds one-to-one with the distribution of ability types in the female population, such that 
𝛼87
𝐸 =  𝑎𝑘 for 𝐸 = 𝑘. As the supply of education expands, women end up with increasingly higher 
educational attainment, but the average ability of women at education levels E>1 declines over 
time. In other words, between 1987 and 2011, low-ability types move into higher education levels.  
The shift is illustrated in Figure 5: by definition, illiterate women in 1987 are of ability level 
𝑎1, which is the ability level of the bottom 42 percent of the distribution. Literate women below 
primary school in 1987 are of ability level 𝑎2, women with primary schooling in 1987 are of ability 
level 𝑎3, and so on. By 2011, all literate women without or with primary schooling are of ability 
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level 𝑎1, as they all fall within the bottom 42 percent of the distribution. Similarly, all women with 
middle school completed in 1987 are of ability level 𝑎4, but their 2011 counterparts are of ability 
levels 𝑎1, 𝑎2 and 𝑎3; and so on for higher education levels. Thus average ability declines at all 
education levels above illiteracy. 
 
Figure 5: Women’s educational attainment in urban India 
 
Note: distribution of married women age 25-54 across levels of educational attainment in 1987 and 2011. Source: NSS 
Employment and Unemployment Survey  
 
Figure 6: Estimated and reweighted marginal effect of education, 1987 and 2011 
 
Note: see Table A1.5 in the appendix. 
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Now assume that the estimated marginal effects of education on women’s labor force 
participation measure the pure ability-selection effect. The 1987 education effects 𝛽1987
𝐸  quantify 
the effect of ability on labor force participation for each ability type k. The education effects in 
other years should differ from those in 1987 only by the change in the ability composition of 
education groups. That is, they are a weighted average of the 1987 estimates. Table A1.5 in the 
appendix shows the original estimated marginal effects of education in columns 1–5, and the 
reweighted effects for 1999, 2004, 2009, and 2011 in columns 6 – 9. Results for secondary and 
graduate education are summarized in Figure 6. 
As Figure 6 shows, the reweighting exercise predicts the change in the marginal effects of 
education from 1987 to 2011 quite well. While this is by no means conclusive evidence that the 
education effects are largely driven by selection,25 it does show that declining selection could 
potentially play a large role in the declining effect of higher education on female labor force 
participation, where declining selection means that women’s selection into education is 
increasingly based on characteristics that are not positively related to labor force participation. 
 
Cohort Analysis 
In a sample of women aged 25 to 54, educational attainment changes over time primarily 
because younger cohorts enter the sample with higher educational attainment while older cohorts 
with lower educational attainment age out of the sample. Consequently, the educational attainment 
by age group increases continuously, while the age composition of the sample is stable over time. 
To further probe the selection channel discussed above, we estimate age-group-specific marginal 
effects of education on labor force participation. If the declining effect of higher education indeed 
                                                 
25 If purely selection-driven, one would not find negative estimates at intermediate education levels. 
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reflects a weaker positive selection into higher education among younger cohorts, we should 
observe that the effect of education is lower for younger women than for older women in a given 
year. Furthermore, we should find that the effect declines over time for a given age group (e.g., as 
30-year old women in 2011 went to school more recently than 30-year old women in 1987) but not 
for a given birth-year cohort (e.g., those born in 1970). 
For this analysis we use five 6-year age groups, which allows us to trace birth cohorts between 
the surveys in 1987, 1999, and 2011. The age group specific effects of education are estimated by 
including interaction effects of age group and education level in the probit specification (Eqn. 1) 
and calculating marginal effects of education for each age group. Figure 7 summarizes the results 
graphically, plotting the marginal effects of graduate education across survey years, by age group 
in panel (a) and by birth-year cohort in panel (b).26 Full results are available in Table A1.6 in the 
appendix. 
 
Figure 7: Marginal effect of graduate education by age group and birth-year cohort 
(a) age groups     (b) birth-year cohorts   
                                                 
26 Marginal effects in nonlinear models vary with the value of other explanatory variables. For interaction terms, this 
variation is typically large. Effects can range from significantly negative to significantly positive, so the average 
marginal effect does not necessarily convey anything meaningful (see Ai and Norton 2004). We find that the marginal 
effects of graduate education are always positive. Effects are statistically significant only for the oldest two age groups 
(i.e., the effect of education is significantly larger for the two oldest groups than for the youngest group). For reasons 
of space we report only the averages, but detailed results are available from the authors. 
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Note: Estimated marginal effects of graduate education, see appendix table A1.6. 
 
These results are in line with the selection channel driving the effect of graduate education: the 
marginal effect is lower for younger age groups than for older age groups in a given year. 
Furthermore, for each age group, the effect declines by about one third over time in each of the two 
12-year periods. Looking at the same results presented by birth-year cohort in panel (b), we see 
some decline in the effect of graduate education over time in those cohorts we can trace, but the 
changes are much smaller.27 
All in all, this is further supporting evidence that declining positive selection is a plausible 
explanation why graduate education has become less positively associated with women’s labor 
force participation in urban India. 
 
 
                                                 
27 For secondary education, the pattern is similar but somewhat less clear than for graduate education (see Table S1.5). 
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VI. Conclusions 
In this paper, we investigate the very low and stagnating female labor force participation rates 
in urban India over the past 25 years. This stagnation is surprising given that it took place at a time 
of high GDP and earnings growth, a sizable fertility decline, a rapid expansion of female education, 
and rising returns to education. A combination of demand and supply side effects appear to have 
played a role in accounting for this stagnation. On the supply side, rising male incomes and 
education have reduced female labor force participation, showing that the classic income effect is 
at work in urban India. The effect of rising female education on female labor force participation is 
more complicated. While the pure shift toward increasing the proportion of women with graduate 
education has increased labor force participation, this effect is moderated and counteracted by 
range of opposing effects. First, the strong conditional U-shape pattern of the effect of education 
on labor force participation suggests that, particularly in the middle of the education distribution, 
other factors depress female labor force participation. This is most likely a result of stigmas for 
these women to be working in low-skilled sectors. But it appears that the role of stigma, at least 
towards working in the manufacturing sector, has started to decline in 2009, when the 
manufacturing sector has started to draw women into the labor force. Second, the positive effect of 
secondary and graduate education on female labor force participation has fallen considerably. We 
show supporting evidence that this is related to a declining positive selection into higher education. 
So even though more women have attained higher education, positive selection effects have been 
diluted, contributing to falling labor force participation rates among the highly educated.  
Demand side changes also play a role. Changes in the sectoral structure of employment 
contributed to a reduction in FLFP rates. Most employment growth occurred in construction and 
low-skilled services, while expansion of employment in manufacturing and white-collar services 
has not been sufficient for absorbing a growing female working-age population.   
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These results suggest that, if current trends and preferences persist, there is little likelihood that 
women will drastically increase their labor force participation rates in coming years. Although 
employment growth in manufacturing has the potential to contribute to rising FLFP, India is, on 
current trends, unlikely to fully reap the benefits of the demographic dividend associated with its 
high share of the working-age population. And importantly, rising education of women will not 
contribute much to their economic empowerment, which is typically associated with employment 
and earnings. As such, the sustainability of India’s high growth is very much in question if it fails 
to substantially improve the integration of educated women into the labor force.  
It is difficult to make any definitive judgments on welfare effects. To the extent women’s labor 
force participation is decided by their families and does not reflect women’s own preferences, or 
is constrained by their inability to migrate for employment, policy action to promote female 
employment would be warranted. But even if the main constraint is women’s own preferences, the 
degree to which this impedes their labor force participation should be a concern to policy makers. 
Our findings point at the importance of mismatches between the sectoral structure of employment 
and women’s preferences. Employment growth in urban India has been concentrated in 
construction and low-skilled services, but from the perspective of female labor force participation 
a different growth strategy would be warranted; a more female-intensive export-oriented growth 
strategy (as has been pursued in many East Asian economies as well as in neighboring Bangladesh) 
would substantially increase female employment opportunities for those in the middle and even the 
top of the education distribution.  
On the supply side, policies explicitly promoting the acceptability of female employment 
outside the public sector, policies to allow a greater compatibility of female employment with 
domestic responsibilities and policies to improve the safety of female workers in the private sector 
could also draw more women into the workforce. 
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Looking beyond India, the results could also hold considerable relevance for other parts of the 
developing world. In particular, in neighboring Pakistan as well as many countries of the Middle 
East and North Africa, substantial growth, fertility decline, and an expansion of female education 
also coexist with very low female labor force participation rates (e.g., World Bank 2003; Gaddis 
and Klasen 2014). The insights from this paper might also inform research and policy-makers in 
those settings.  
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Appendix 1 
  
Table A1.1: Female population and labor force by year, sector, and age group (in millions) 
Urban  1987 1993 1999 2004 2009 2011 
All ages Population 88.9  109.7  125.3  136.5  155.8  170.0  
 Labor force (ps) 11.5 (0.13) 14.5 (0.13) 15.8 (0.13) 20.2 (0.15) 20.0 (0.13) 22.8 (0.13) 
 Labor force (ps+ss) 14.4 (0.16) 18.1 (0.16) 18.5 (0.15) 24.3 (0.18) 22.8 (0.15) 26.3 (0.15) 
Age 15-64 Population 53.7  69.0  80.2  90.8  107.9  118.3  
 Labor force (ps) 10.8 (0.20) 13.7 (0.20) 15.0 (0.19) 19.4 (0.21) 19.6 (0.18) 22.2 (0.19) 
 Labor force (ps+ss) 13.4 (0.25) 17.1 (0.25) 17.5 (0.22) 23.3 (0.26) 22.2 (0.21) 25.7 (0.22) 
Age 25-54 Population 31.1  41.1  49.0  55.9  67.1  74.1  
 Labor force (ps) 7.1 (0.23) 9.5 (0.23) 10.8 (0.22) 13.9 (0.25) 14.3 (0.21) 16.6 (0.22) 
 Labor force (ps+ss) 8.9 (0.28) 11.9 (0.29) 12.6 (0.26) 16.5 (0.30) 16.3 (0.24) 19.2 (0.26) 
              
Rural  1987 1993 1999 2004 2009 2011 
All ages Population 309.5  339.3  377.1  408.9  423.4  427.6  
 Labor force (ps) 77.9 (0.25) 80.4 (0.24) 88.0 (0.23) 102.0 (0.25) 87.9 (0.21) 77.4 (0.18) 
 Labor force (ps+ss) 101.5 (0.33) 112.1 (0.33) 113.2 (0.30) 136.2 (0.33) 112.2 (0.26) 108.0 (0.25) 
Age 15-64 Population 178.2  202.7  223.2  249.8  271.3  276.2  
 Labor force (ps) 71.6 (0.40) 74.4 (0.37) 82.6 (0.37) 97.0 (0.39) 84.0 (0.31) 74.1 (0.27) 
 Labor force (ps+ss) 92.1 (0.52) 104.0 (0.51) 106.4 (0.48) 129.3 (0.52) 107.1 (0.39) 103.6 (0.37) 
Age 25-54 Population 104.4  121.3  135.3  152.0  167.0  169.5  
 Labor force (ps) 47.0 (0.45) 49.8 (0.41) 57.4 (0.42) 68.3 (0.45) 60.6 (0.36) 54.2 (0.32) 
 Labor force (ps+ss) 60.0 (0.57) 69.9 (0.58) 74.0 (0.55) 90.4 (0.59) 77.3 (0.46) 75.4 (0.44) 
              
Total, all ages 1987 1993 1999 2004 2009 2011 
Female Labor force (ps) 89.4 (0.22) 94.9 (0.21) 103.8 (0.21) 122.2 (0.22) 107.9 (0.19) 100.2 (0.17) 
Male Labor force (ps) 227.4 (0.53) 262.5 (0.55) 284.4 (0.54) 316.2 (0.55) 340.3 (0.55) 347.5 (0.55) 
Note: Numbers in millions, labor force participation rates are in parentheses. Labor force (ps) refers to principal status workers, (ps+ss) refers to principal and 
subsidiary status. Source: NSS Employment and Unemployment Surveys, with total population from the World Bank World Development Indicators.  
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Table A1.2: Definition of education levels 
Illiterate below primary Not literate 
Literate Literate without formal schooling or below primary level 
Primary Completed primary education 
Middle Completed middle school 
Secondary Completed secondary or higher secondary schooling 
Graduate Graduate or post-graduate degree 
 
 
 
Table A1.3: Estimation results (average marginal effects) low-education subsample 
Pr(Labor force) 1987 1999 2004 2009 2011 
Own education (Ref. = Illiterate):     
Literate -0.050*** -0.068*** -0.048*** -0.030** -0.026*   
 (0.010) (0.012) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)    
Primary -0.071*** -0.076*** -0.058*** -0.019 -0.022    
 (0.009) (0.012) (0.016) (0.014) (0.016)    
Middle -0.058*** -0.079*** -0.093*** -0.052*** -0.054*** 
 (0.012) (0.010) (0.013) (0.014) (0.014)    
Log income -0.030*** -0.020*** -0.030*** -0.033*** -0.038*** 
 (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005)    
Male salaried emp. -0.048*** -0.071*** -0.050*** -0.024** -0.014    
 (0.008) (0.009) (0.011) (0.012) (0.010)    
Household head education (Ref. = Illiterate):   
Literate -0.057*** -0.029 -0.041** -0.025 0.019    
 (0.012) (0.019) (0.017) (0.018) (0.020)    
Primary -0.097*** -0.067*** -0.047*** -0.038** -0.066*** 
 (0.012) (0.013) (0.016) (0.015) (0.017)    
Middle -0.112*** -0.103*** -0.076*** -0.079*** -0.080*** 
 (0.014) (0.011) (0.014) (0.016) (0.015)    
Secondary -0.173*** -0.148*** -0.127*** -0.099*** -0.121*** 
 (0.014) (0.012) (0.015) (0.017) (0.017)    
Graduate -0.166*** -0.144*** -0.170*** -0.130*** -0.130*** 
 (0.022) (0.018) (0.022) (0.026) (0.025)    
Social group(Ref. = Hindu non-SCST):    
SCST 0.085*** 0.046*** 0.041*** 0.063*** 0.035*** 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.015) (0.017) (0.012)    
Muslim -0.059*** -0.086*** -0.097*** -0.100*** -0.086*** 
 (0.010) (0.011) (0.016) (0.014) (0.013)    
Other   0.007 -0.045** -0.019 0.010 0.012    
 (0.018) (0.017) (0.027) (0.028) (0.029)    
Age 0.013*** 0.029*** 0.023*** 0.022*** 0.018*** 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005)    
Age2 -0.0002*** -0.0004*** -0.0003*** -0.0003*** -0.0003*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)    
Children 0-4 -0.022*** -0.017*** -0.022*** -0.034*** -0.036*** 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.008) (0.009)    
Children 5-14 -0.000 0.001 0.015*** 0.002 0.011*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004)    
Table continues on next page. 
  
48 
 
Table A1.3, continued 
Pr(Labor force) 1987 1999 2004 2009 2011 
District male employment shares (Ref. = construction):  
Agriculture 0.295** 0.221** 0.089 0.027 0.276**  
 (0.150) (0.104) (0.140) (0.135) (0.124)    
Manufacturing 0.131 -0.031 -0.057 0.207* 0.242**  
 (0.136) (0.099) (0.124) (0.119) (0.096)    
Services 0.008 -0.051 -0.086 0.113 -0.010    
 (0.141) (0.091) (0.121) (0.103) (0.091)    
White-collar services 0.006 -0.052 -0.191 0.024 -0.048    
 (0.143) (0.114) (0.148) (0.139) (0.126)    
District graduate share 0.012 -0.015 0.107 -0.282** 0.078    
 (0.127) (0.093) (0.119) (0.125) (0.106)    
      
N 22176 21143 19648 15807 15307   
Pseudo R2 0.175 0.157 0.151 0.138 0.134 
FLFP rate 0.174 0.176 0.207 0.179 0.179 
Note: Married women age 25-54 with less than secondary education. All estimations include state fixed effects. 
District-clustered standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. 
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Table A1.4: Estimation results (average marginal effects) high-education subsample 
Pr(Labor force) 1987 1999 2004 2009 2011 
Own education (Ref. = Secondary):     
Graduate 0.198*** 0.204*** 0.158*** 0.162*** 0.166*** 
 (0.017) (0.013) (0.016) (0.015) (0.014)    
Log income -0.048*** -0.014*** -0.035*** -0.025*** -0.007    
 (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.004) (0.005)    
Male salaried emp. 0.100*** 0.049*** 0.041*** 0.038*** 0.013    
 (0.015) (0.014) (0.013) (0.012) (0.018)    
Household head education (Ref. = Illiterate):   
Literate 0.026 -0.067** 0.011 0.025 0.041    
 (0.076) (0.033) (0.065) (0.043) (0.048)    
Primary 0.058 -0.004 -0.018 0.047 0.049    
 (0.064) (0.043) (0.050) (0.037) (0.037)    
Middle 0.026 -0.018 -0.004 0.026 -0.013    
 (0.054) (0.039) (0.050) (0.030) (0.032)    
Secondary 0.012 -0.046 -0.037 -0.007 0.001    
 (0.050) (0.032) (0.043) (0.026) (0.027)    
Graduate -0.018 -0.073** -0.025 0.003 -0.045    
 (0.050) (0.032) (0.044) (0.027) (0.032)    
Social group(Ref. = Hindu non-SCST):    
SCST 0.114*** 0.077*** 0.032 0.052** 0.028    
 (0.042) (0.022) (0.027) (0.022) (0.019)    
Muslim -0.035 0.010 -0.052*** -0.051*** -0.067*** 
 (0.029) (0.023) (0.019) (0.020) (0.020)    
Other   0.059** 0.054** 0.019 0.028 0.043**  
 (0.024) (0.023) (0.019) (0.021) (0.020)    
Age 0.047*** 0.020*** 0.041*** 0.010 0.011    
 (0.009) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007)    
Age2 -0.0006*** -0.0002** -0.0005*** -0.0001 -0.0001 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)    
Children 0-4 -0.026*** -0.017** -0.035*** -0.035*** -0.037**  
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.011) (0.011) (0.015)    
Children 5-14 -0.034*** -0.010* -0.017** -0.012 -0.002    
 (0.007) (0.005) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007)    
District male employment shares (Ref. = construction):  
Agriculture 0.010 0.005 0.268* -0.093 0.130    
 (0.170) (0.178) (0.149) (0.137) (0.116)    
Manufacturing -0.122 -0.212 -0.001 0.067 0.309*** 
 (0.148) (0.133) (0.144) (0.107) (0.098)    
Services -0.194 -0.131 0.129 0.142 0.058    
 (0.141) (0.140) (0.136) (0.107) (0.096)    
White-collar services -0.183 0.055 0.134 0.329** 0.195    
 (0.159) (0.141) (0.156) (0.137) (0.125)    
District graduate share 0.022 -0.250** -0.044 -0.525*** -0.220**  
 (0.139) (0.127) (0.134) (0.115) (0.108)    
      
N 6855 11392 9865 11391 11999    
Pseudo R2 0.105 0.118 0.119 0.108 0.085 
FLFP rate 0.224 0.184 0.195 0.167 0.178 
Note: Married women age 25-54 with at least secondary education. All estimations include state fixed effects. 
District-clustered standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. 
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Table A1.5: Estimated and reweighted marginal effects of education 
 Estimated marginal effects  Reweighted marginal effects 
 1987 1999 2004 2009 2011  1999 2004 2009 2011 
Illiterate 0 0 0 0 0  0 0 0  
Literate -0.050 -0.063 -0.051 -0.030 -0.026  0 0 0  
Primary -0.072 -0.074 -0.062 -0.025 -0.027  -0.042 -0.022 0.000 0.000 
Middle -0.067 -0.084 -0.100 -0.060 -0.064  -0.071 -0.065 -0.052 -0.042 
Secondary 0.086 -0.020 -0.048 -0.056 -0.041  -0.005 -0.020 -0.051 -0.057 
Graduate 0.324 0.217 0.144 0.131 0.151  0.223 0.207 0.183 0.179 
Note: Estimated marginal effects from equation (1) in the main text. Reweighting based on the education 
distribution as reported in table 1 in the main text. 
 
 
Table A1.6: Age-group-specific marginal effects of education 
 1987 1999 2004 2009 2011 
Age 25-30      
Literate -0.025* -0.046** -0.026 -0.011 -0.081*** 
 (0.015) (0.018) (0.024) (0.022) (0.023) 
Primary -0.064*** -0.073*** -0.034 -0.021 -0.015 
 (0.012) (0.015) (0.026) (0.017) (0.027) 
Middle -0.069*** -0.088*** -0.097*** -0.053*** -0.074*** 
 (0.011) (0.013) (0.020) (0.020) (0.022) 
Secondary 0.051*** -0.044*** -0.045** -0.057*** -0.041 
 (0.016) (0.014) (0.021) (0.018) (0.030) 
Graduate 0.287*** 0.166*** 0.094*** 0.138*** 0.103*** 
 (0.030) (0.023) (0.028) (0.028) (0.035) 
Age 31-36      
Literate -0.031* -0.068*** -0.053** -0.058** 0.045 
 (0.018) (0.020) (0.024) (0.029) (0.036) 
Primary -0.065*** -0.047** -0.061** -0.029 -0.017 
 (0.017) (0.018) (0.024) (0.030) (0.031) 
Middle -0.051** -0.071*** -0.094*** -0.025 -0.048** 
 (0.022) (0.015) (0.026) (0.026) (0.022) 
Secondary 0.077*** -0.026 -0.066*** -0.066** -0.031 
 (0.020) (0.019) (0.024) (0.027) (0.022) 
Graduate 0.332*** 0.210*** 0.166*** 0.078** 0.154*** 
 (0.030) (0.035) (0.031) (0.032) (0.027) 
Age 37-42      
Literate -0.061*** -0.080*** -0.031 -0.001 -0.033 
 (0.019) (0.027) (0.028) (0.028) (0.031) 
Primary -0.070*** -0.094*** -0.051* -0.027 -0.054** 
 (0.016) (0.025) (0.029) (0.027) (0.024) 
Middle -0.076*** -0.085*** -0.095*** -0.086*** -0.080*** 
 (0.019) (0.024) (0.030) (0.024) (0.025) 
Secondary 0.157*** -0.029 -0.028 -0.061*** -0.072*** 
 (0.025) (0.025) (0.027) (0.022) (0.024) 
Graduate 0.351*** 0.247*** 0.191*** 0.131*** 0.166*** 
 (0.031) (0.040) (0.041) (0.034) (0.031) 
Table continues on next page. 
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Table A1.6, continued 
 1987 1999 2004 2009 2011 
Age 43-48      
Literate -0.091*** -0.058** -0.058** -0.091*** -0.009 
 (0.019) (0.023) (0.024) (0.027) (0.028) 
Primary -0.098*** -0.090*** -0.112*** -0.019 -0.020 
 (0.022) (0.020) (0.025) (0.029) (0.024) 
Middle -0.080*** -0.113*** -0.130*** -0.080** -0.036 
 (0.030) (0.015) (0.019) (0.036) (0.025) 
Secondary 0.164*** 0.002 -0.052** -0.046 -0.019 
 (0.042) (0.023) (0.024) (0.030) (0.020) 
Graduate 0.432*** 0.291*** 0.178*** 0.183*** 0.184*** 
 (0.045) (0.035) (0.039) (0.037) (0.041) 
Age 49-54      
Literate -0.114*** -0.068** -0.146*** -0.011 -0.049* 
 (0.021) (0.027) (0.035) (0.044) (0.027) 
Primary -0.108*** -0.112*** -0.102*** -0.041 -0.051* 
 (0.020) (0.022) (0.034) (0.031) (0.029) 
Middle -0.064** -0.067** -0.121*** -0.104*** -0.098*** 
 (0.029) (0.026) (0.032) (0.023) (0.026) 
Secondary 0.035 0.092*** -0.061 -0.053 -0.058** 
 (0.036) (0.033) (0.038) (0.033) (0.023) 
Graduate 0.408*** 0.285*** 0.124*** 0.164*** 0.248*** 
 (0.052) (0.068) (0.042) (0.049) (0.044) 
 
N 29031 32541 29513 27198 27306 
Note: Average marginal effects, calculated after estimation of Equation (1) in the main text, with interactions of 
age group and education levels. Reference group is illiterate. All variables reported in the main estimation results 
(table 2 in the main text) are included in the estimation, but not reported here. 
 
 
 
Figure A1.1: Real weekly earnings, urban India 1987-2011 
 
Note: Average total weekly earnings for employees in age group 25-54. Earnings are spatially 
deflated and in 1987-88 Rupees, based on the Labour Bureau Consumer Price Index for 
Industrial Workers and Deaton (2003). Source: NSS Employment and Unemployment Survey 
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Figure A1.2: Educational attainment, urban India 1987-2011 
 
Note: Women and men age 25-54. Source: NSS Employment and Unemployment Survey 
 
 
 
 
Figure A1.3: Women’s educational attainment, by migration background  
 
Note: Women of all ages. Source: NSS Employment and Unemployment Surveys for 1987-88, 1999-00, and 
2009-10. NSSO (2010) for 2007-08 numbers. 
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Appendix 2: The effect of wages 
To obtain estimates of the own-wage effects on fem.ae labor force participation, we estimate 
equation (1) in the main text, that is 𝑃𝑖𝑡 = 𝐹(𝛼𝑠𝑡 +  ∑ 𝛽𝑡
𝐸  𝐷𝑖𝑡
𝐸
𝐸 +  𝛽𝑋𝑡 𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽𝑍𝑡 𝑍𝑖𝑡), with the 
log wage included in 𝑋𝑖𝑡. Wages are observed only for employed women (regular employees 
and casual workers) and need to be imputed for all others. As is standard in the literature, this 
imputation will be based on a wage equation with human capital variables and a number of 
control variables, as will be explained below. We note, however, that self-employment income 
and especially the “earnings” of unpaid family workers are unlikely to be predicted well by this 
equation. The returns to education, for example, are likely to be different for employees versus 
self-employed workers, but the NSS surveys collect no income or earnings data for self-
employed workers so we do not have the data to estimate activity-specific wage equations. In 
estimating own-wage effects, therefore, we focus on the probability of working for pay in a 
sample excluding self-employed and unpaid family workers. 
We estimate a wage equation with Heckman selection bias correction (Heckman, 1979) 
separately for each year, regressing real weekly earnings on state, age, age squared, education 
level, social group, and a variable qit that is further discussed below: 
ln 𝑤𝑖𝑡 =  𝛽𝑠𝑡 +  𝛽1𝑡𝑋𝑖𝑡
𝑊  + 𝛽2𝑡𝑞𝑖𝑡  +  𝛽3𝑡𝜆𝑖𝑡  +  𝑢𝑖𝑡 ,   (W1) 
where the vector 𝑋𝑖𝑡
𝑊 contains the variables listed above, and it is the sample selection 
correction term. The latter is obtained (as the inverse Mills ratio) from a probit model for labor 
force participation. This selection equation is equal to equation (1) in the main text, except for 
the expected market wage that is replaced by qit: 
𝑃𝑖𝑡 = 𝐹(𝛼𝑠𝑡 +  ∑ 𝛽𝑡
𝐸  𝐷𝑖𝑡
𝐸
𝐸 +  𝛽𝑋𝑡 𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽𝑍𝑡 𝑍𝑖𝑡 + 𝑞𝑖𝑡).  (W2) 
The selection effect in equation (W1) is identified by the district variables vector 𝑍𝑖𝑡 and the 
variables in 𝑋𝑖𝑡 that are not included in 𝑋𝑖𝑡
𝑊, namely income, security of income, 
underemployment of household members, education of the household head, the number of 
children by age group, and the presence of in-law parents.  
For all women in the sample, the predicted log wage  used in the estimation of equation 
(1) is the linear prediction based on equation (W1) (excluding the sample selection term). The 
own wage effect is thus identified through the variable qit. As Heim (2007) discusses, past 
studies have used a variety of methods to identify the own wage effect on female labor supply, 
but there is usually no truly exogenous source of variation in wages that can be used. Policy 
changes such as tax reforms have been used for difference-in-difference estimations, but even 
itwˆln
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if such reforms have taken place they do not allow for a comparison of own wage effects over 
time for a sample of women representative of the female working age population.  
 For lack of truly exogenous variation in wages, we compare own-wage effects identified 
from two different sources of variation.28 First, we use interactions of state, education level, and 
age group dummies (age 25-29, 30-39, 40-49, and 50-54) to identify the own wage effect. This 
is related to grouped estimations of women’s hours worked in Blau and Kahn (2007), which is 
equivalent to using group membership dummies as instrument for the wage in a linear labor 
supply model (Angrist, 1991). Second, we use spatial variation in wages, taking for qit the 
average wage of other women in the same district. Reflecting the local labor market, the district 
average wage should be a good predictor of women’s own wage. We also estimate the model 
without the own wage to check the robustness of other coefficients.  
Results are summarized in Tables A2.1 and A2.2 below, which report the marginal effects 
of the own-wage, education, and household income. Estimates for other variables are not shown 
but are almost identical across the three specifications. Results for the specification excluding 
the own wage (table A2.1) are furthermore very similar to the results in the main text, despite 
dropping self-employed women from the sample. In columns 1-4 of Table A2.2, the own wage 
effect is identified by state-education-age group dummies. We find a positive own wage effect 
for all years, though the effect is economically small. A wage difference between state-
education-age groups of 10 percent (i.e. a difference of 0.1 in the log wage) corresponds to a 
difference of around 0.25 percentage points in labor force participation. In columns 5-8, where 
the own wage effect is identified on variation across district, we see a negative own wage effect 
(though not significant at the 5% level except for 1987), showing that FLFP tends to be lower 
in high-wage districts.   
As discussed above, in both specifications the exclusion restrictions are not necessarily 
satisfied, resulting in potentially biased estimates. For example, if district average wages 
capture general living standards beyond what we are able to control for with total household 
earnings and household head education, the estimates are biased downwards due to negative 
income effects. The group dummies, on the other hand, are more likely be correlated with 
human capital characteristics that are positively linked to labor force participation, as they 
capture variation across cohorts from the same state and with the same educational attainment. 
This could for example include the quality of education. Because the estimates are different in 
                                                 
28 Two recent studies on female labor supply in the US (Blau and Kahn, 2007; Heim, 2007) find own wage 
estimates and changes in estimates comparable across several specifications. Even though, arguably, none of those 
estimates is properly identified, the robustness across specifications gives credence to their findings. 
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sign, we believe it is best not to draw any conclusion regarding the importance of wages for 
women’s labor for participation in urban India. Most importantly, the estimated effects of 
education show very similar patterns across education levels and over time whether or not we 
control for wages.  
 
 
Table A2.1: Marginal effect on the probability of wage employment 
 
Pr(emp) 1987 1999 2004 2009 2011 
Own education (Ref. = Illiterate):    
Literate -0.036*** -0.050*** -0.029** -0.038*** -0.012 
 (0.007) (0.010) (0.012) (0.010) (0.011) 
Primary -0.056*** -0.056*** -0.048*** -0.028*** -0.022* 
 (0.006) (0.009) (0.011) (0.009) (0.013) 
Middle -0.046*** -0.068*** -0.072*** -0.053*** -0.055*** 
 (0.008) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010) 
Secondary 0.108*** 0.016 -0.005 -0.035*** -0.033*** 
 (0.012) (0.011) (0.014) (0.010) (0.011) 
Graduate 0.343*** 0.235*** 0.187*** 0.160*** 0.177*** 
 (0.019) (0.019) (0.022) (0.020) (0.020) 
      
Log income -0.036*** -0.018*** -0.035*** -0.030*** -0.022*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
N 27122 30323 26953 25527 25573 
Pseudo R2 0.19 0.16 0.17 0.17 0.14 
Note: Sample includes married women age 25-54 who are not self-employed or head of their household. 
Further control variables are listed in the main text. District-clustered standard errors in parentheses. *** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. 
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Table A2.2: Estimated average marginal effects with own wage 
 State-education-age group  District average wage 
Pr(emp) 1987 1999 2004 2009 2011  1987 1999 2004 2009 2011 
Log wage 0.003 0.027*** 0.028** 0.021*** 0.031***  -0.096*** -0.146* -0.084 -0.031 -0.036 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.013) (0.006) (0.008)  (0.033) (0.080) (0.056) (0.039) (0.047) 
Own education (Ref. = Illiterate):          
Literate -0.031*** -0.045*** -0.052*** -0.034*** -0.027***  -0.022*** -0.029*** -0.030*** -0.029*** -0.019** 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.013) (0.012) (0.010)  (0.005) (0.006) (0.009) (0.007) (0.008) 
Primary -0.054*** -0.061*** -0.072*** -0.032*** -0.039***  -0.037*** -0.049*** -0.049*** -0.027*** -0.034*** 
 (0.006) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009)  (0.004) (0.004) (0.010) (0.008) (0.008) 
Middle -0.047*** -0.068*** -0.086*** -0.061*** -0.067***  -0.007 -0.051*** -0.058*** -0.049*** -0.054*** 
 (0.008) (0.009) (0.011) (0.009) (0.009)  (0.014) (0.004) (0.011) (0.010) (0.009) 
Secondary 0.083*** -0.017 -0.040* -0.049*** -0.051***  0.302*** 0.251* 0.126 -0.008 0.004 
 (0.021) (0.015) (0.021) (0.011) (0.009)  (0.078) (0.147) (0.090) (0.031) (0.037) 
Graduate 0.309*** 0.148*** 0.115*** 0.116*** 0.099***  0.627*** 0.649*** 0.435*** 0.278** 0.296** 
 (0.041) (0.031) (0.040) (0.025) (0.020)  (0.076) (0.129) (0.146) (0.126) (0.138) 
            
Log income -0.032*** -0.019*** -0.033*** -0.025*** -0.021***  -0.032*** -0.019*** -0.033*** -0.026*** -0.022*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
N 27123 30323 26953 25527 25573  26686 29801 26593 24945 24883 
Pseudo R2 0.19 0.16 0.17 0.17 0.14  0.19 0.16 0.17 0.16 0.14 
Note: Sample includes married women age 25-54 who are not self-employed. Further control variables are listed in the main text. Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. 
 
 
 
 
